Depressive Deficits in Recognition:  Dissociation of Recollection and Familiarity by Hertel, Paula T & Milan, S.
Trinity University 
Digital Commons @ Trinity 
Psychology Faculty Research Psychology Department 
1994 
Depressive Deficits in Recognition: Dissociation of Recollection 
and Familiarity 
Paula T. Hertel 
Trinity University, phertel@trinity.edu 
S. Milan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.trinity.edu/psych_faculty 
 Part of the Psychology Commons 
Publication Details 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology 
Repository Citation 
Hertel, P.T., & Milan, S. (1994). Depressive deficits in recognition: Dissociation of recollection and 
familiarity. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 103(4), 736-742. doi: 10.1037/0021-843X.103.4.736 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Psychology Department at Digital Commons @ 
Trinity. It has been accepted for inclusion in Psychology Faculty Research by an authorized administrator of Digital 
Commons @ Trinity. For more information, please contact jcostanz@trinity.edu. 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology 
1994, Vol. 103, No.4, 736-742 Copyright 1994 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0021-843X/94/$3.00 
Depressive Deficits in Recognition: Dissociation of 
Recollection and Familiarity 
Paula T. Hertel and Stephanie Milan 
Dysphoric and nondysphoric students (48 women and 24 men) participated in an experiment that 
was designed to separate automatic and controlled uses of memory in a modified recognition para­
digm. First, they judged the relation of target words to paired words. Later they made recognition 
decisions on target items alone or in the context of the original paired item. The use ofL. L. Jacoby's 
( 1991) process dissociation procedure revealed depressive deficits in estimates of recollection but 
not in estimates of familiarity. T he paired test improved recollection for all subjects and showed a 
trend in the direction of increased familiarity. These outcomes support approaches to depressive 
cognition that emphasize impaired cognitive control. 
Depressed mood is associated with deficient performance in 
some tests of memory. Direct tests of free recall show the asso­
ciation most frequently (see reviews by Hartlage, Alloy, Vaz­
quez, & Dykman, 1993; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Ma­
thews, 1988). Indirect tests of unaware remembering have not 
yet shown it (see Roediger & McDermott, 1992). In the middle, 
tests of recognition give mixed results. Watts, Morris, and Mac­
Leod ( 1987) saw this mixture as a reflection of variations in the 
sensitivity of recognition measures, and indeed there are now 
several studies that have used signal-detection analyses to reveal 
evidence of depression-related deficits in recognition accuracy 
(e.g., Channon, Baker, & Robertson, 1993; Hertel & Hardin, 
1990; Watts et al., 1987). Our purpose was to take a different 
tack in the investigation of depressive performance on tests of 
recognition. The approach rests on a theoretical analysis of rec­
ognition processes developed by Jacoby (1991). We describe 
this approach first and then relate the analysis to theoretical 
frameworks for studying depressed moods and memory. 
Recognition decisions can be based either on recollection of 
an item's prior occurrence or on the more general sense that 
the item feels familiar (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Mandler, 1980). 
Familiarity-based decisions need not involve attention to past 
events; in that sense, they reflect automatic influences of prior 
experience (see Hasher & Zacks, 1979). Recollection (remem­
bering that an item occurred in a specific context) refers to con­
scious reflection on the past. With this distinction in mind, Ja­
coby ( 1991) argued that performance on memory tests in gen­
eral involves both automatic and controlled uses of past 
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experience; recognition decisions in particular are based on 
both feelings of familiarity and conscious recollection. 
Jacoby and his colleagues (e.g., Jacoby, 1991; Jacoby, Toth, & 
Yonelinas, 1993) have developed a process dissociation frame­
work for understanding the relative contributions of automatic 
and controlled uses of memory in recognition and other tests. 
Essentially, the approach is to place those two types of proce­
dures in opposition to each other, through the use of different 
test instructions. On an inclusion test for recognition, subjects 
are instructed to endorse as old all items from two prior phases 
of the experiment. Subjects respond on the basis of familiarity 
or on the basis of recollecting a prior occurrence; familiarity 
and recollection act together and in the same direction to facili­
tate recognition of prior items. On the exclusion test, however, 
subjects are instructed to exclude items from the first (or criti­
cal) phase of the experiment, to call only items from Phase 2 
old. In this case, familiarity and recollection operate in opposi­
tion for Phase 1 items; subjects respond old only to the extent 
that they are guided by familiarity, because if they recollect the 
item's occurrence in Phase 1, they will correctly respond new. 
Jacoby's ( 1991) framework makes certain assumptions about 
the probability of responding old to an item from Phase 1 under 
each instruction. In inclusion, the probability of responding old 
( Oi) equals the probability that the item is recollected from 
Phase l (R) or, if it is not recollected, the probability that it feels 
familiar ([ 1 - R]F). In exclusion, the probability of responding 
old ( O.) simply equals the probability that the item is familiar 
but not recollected from Phase 1 ([ 1 - R]F). Therefore, the 
probability that an item is recollected from Phase 1 can be cal­
culated algebraically: 
Oi = R + (I - R) F 
Oe=(1-R)F 
R = oi- o. 
Estimates of recollection are thus obtained by subtracting the 
proportion of items judged old on the exclusion test from the 
proportion judged old on the inclusion test. Estimates of famil­
iarity are then derived by substitution. 
The procedure is called process dissociation because a variety 
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of independent variables have produced functional dissocia­
tions in the estimates for recollection and familiarity (or similar 
parameters in tests of stem completion). Relevant to our con­
cern, several manipulations have affected estimates of the com­
ponent for recollection but left estimates of the automatic com­
ponent invariant. These include semantic versus nonsemantic 
orienting tasks (Toth, Reingold, & Jacoby, 1994), degree of at­
tention (Jacoby et al., 1993), and list length (Yonelinas & Ja­
coby, in press). In regard to recognition memory in particular, 
Jacoby (1991) showed that dividing subjects' attention at the 
time of the test reduces the size of the estimate for recollection 
(disrupts it) but leaves the automatic effects of prior experience 
intact (does not affect familiarity). Similarly, we intended to test 
whether depressed or dysphoric states operate like divided at­
tention at either study or test phases in reducing the recollective 
aspect of recognition memory. 
In the literature on depressive memory, several investigators 
have argued that depressive impairments reflect reduced cogni­
tive capacity (see Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Williams et al., 1988). 
Resource allocation theory, for example, asserts that depressed 
subjects' cognitive resources, perhaps because they are perva­
sively consumed by self-relevant thoughts, are insufficient to 
produce good performance on more resource-demanding tasks 
(Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988). With a different emphasis, we un­
derstand such impairments as reflections of deficits in cognitive 
initiative (Hertel & Hardin, 1990; Hertel & Rude, 1991 ). The 
notion is that depressed people experience difficulties in moni­
toring and self-sustained attention but that they are quite capa­
ble of performing resource-demanding tasks when guided to use 
procedures that nondepressed subjects perform on their own 
initiative. For example, it has been shown that depressed and 
dysphoric persons can benefit from procedures designed to hold 
their attention on the task (Hertel & Rude, 1991) and to moni­
tor the relevance of the past (Hertel & Hardin, 1990). Both the 
cognitive-effort and the initiative perspectives on depressive 
memory emphasize cognitive control as the locus of depressive 
impairments. From both points of view, then, one may expect 
deficits in estimates of recollection but not in estimates of fa­
miliarity as a basis of recognition memory. 
In addition to testing that prediction, a further goal of our 
study was to determine which component of recognition was 
affected by the reinstatement of prior context. Contextual cues 
provided at the time of the test may increase the familiarity of 
the target items. They may also improve recollection if they es­
tablish a basis for distinguishing among items from the two lists. 
In Phase I of this experiment, the subjects rated target words 
for their degree of relation to paired words; in Phase 2, they 
tried to learn another set of words presented singly. Then on 
the test, Phase 1 targets were presented with the original paired 
words, but Phase 2 words and distractors were presented with 
new paired words. This paired test was administered to half of 
the subjects, whereas the others saw single targets, Phase 2 
words, and distractors. In short, the paired test provided context 
that either made the target seem more or less familiar or estab­
lished a basis for list discrimination to aid recollection. The pro­
cess dissociation procedure ought to reveal the nature of these 
contextual effects, as well as determine whether it depends on 
the subject's emotional state. In searching for ways to repair 
depressive deficits in cognitive control, we hoped that the paired 
test would increase the recollective component of recognition 
for dysphoric subjects. 
In summary, because depressive deficits are typically attrib­
uted to impaired cognitive control, we predicted a dissociation 
in the component processes of recognition as a function of sub­
jects' emotional state. Dysphoric subjects were expected to 
show deficient recollective processes but unimpaired automatic 
influences. Second, we sought to discover whether the deficit 
in recollection would be partially repaired by the provision of 
context from the rating phase at the time of the test. 
Method 
Overview 
The experiment was run in three phases. In Phase I, all subjects rated 
the semantic relatedness within 60 pairs of unrelated words. The first 
members of the pairs served as target items on the later recognition test; 
the second members provided context for the relatedness judgment. In 
Phase 2, subjects listened to a tape of 60 additional words under expec­
tations of a memory test. The sole purpose of Phase 2, however, was to 
provide a set of words for the recognition test that would consistently 
require a judgment of old. Without this phase subjects would be asked 
to call all items new under the exclusion instructions. 
In the final phase the recognition test was given. Words were ordered 
in blocks according to instructions to include items from Phase I or to 
exclude them. Half of the subjects in each mood condition took a single­
item test; the others made recognition judgments about the first mem­
bers of pairs, wherein the second members recapitulated the original 
context of Phase I words. The second members for pairs of Phase 2 and 
new words, of course, were new to the subjects. Subjects were told to 
decide about the first word in the pair and were advised that the second 
item in the pair might help them to decide. 
Subjects 
A total of 89 students initially participated in the experiment; the 
final sample of72 was selected according to the following procedures. 
Procedures for selection. First, we administered the Beck Depres­
sion Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) 
to a lower division psychology class approximately 2 weeks before indi­
vidual experimental sessions were scheduled; additional classes were 
surveyed when needed throughout the period of the experiment. The 
students did not sign the inventories but did provide a signed consent 
form that was separated from the inventory after both forms were coded 
with a subject number. After the inventories were scored, the subject 
numbers of students selected for recruiting were assigned to conditions 
of the experimental design in a manner that ensured counterbalancing 
within each experimental and mood condition. Then the experimenter, 
unaware of mood information, matched the subject number and condi­
tion assignment with the student's name and called the student to re­
quest participation. (Ten students declined the invitation.) 
Students who scored over 9 (but generally higher) were recruited for 
the dysphoric sample; students who scored from I to 7 were recruited 
for the nondysphoric sample. Students received credit toward their 
course grade for filling out the inventories and, separately, for partici­
pating in the experiment. 
At the end of the experimental session, the subjects filled out the BDI, 
the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lus­
hene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983), and a mood and health questionnaire, 
sealed them in envelopes coded with subject numbers, and returned the 
envelopes. The subjects were led to believe that the packet of inventories 
was not related to the topic of the experiment. Items on the question-
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Table I 
Mean Scores on the Mood Indexes 
Dysphoric Nondysphoric 
Single Single 
Index item Paired item Paired 
Beck Depression Inventory 17.7 17.1 4.9 3.2 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
State 48.8 53.3 40.5 36.1 
Trait 51.4 53.2 35.7 39.3 
Note. Scores are reported by mood (dysphoric vs. nondysphoric) and test condition (single item vs. 
paired). n = 18 for all Beck Depression Inventory and State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, State scale adminis­
trations; for State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, Trait scale, ns = 17, 17, 15, and 17, respectively. 
naire allowed us to verify the dysphoric and nondysphoric states of the 
subjects. We set aside the data from 8 subjects whose BDI scores did not 
remain in the initial category or whose responses on the questionnaire 
clearly ruled out a dysphoric state (see Deardorff & Funabiki, 1985). 
Final sample. The data from an additional 9 subjects (5 nondys­
phoric and 4 dysphoric) were set aside because they clearly misun­
derstood the instructions about inclusion and exclusion. Twelve women 
and 6 men were assigned to each of the conditions that resulted from 
the combination of mood (dysphoric vs. nondysphoric) and type of test 
(single-item vs. paired). Also, in each condition, 3 subjects were as­
signed to each of the six word-presentation conditions, which we de­
scribe later; one assignment error (for a dysphoric subject taking the 
single-item test) resulted in uneven sample sizes across the word-pre­
sentation conditions. The average number of days between the first and 
second administration of the BDI was 16. 
Mean scores on the postexperimental BDI and the STAI are listed in 
Table I. These means reliably differed in terms of mood group but not 
for the type of test. Bivariate correlations among these measures ranged 
from .73 to .78 and were all reliable. 
Materials 
Target words. From Ku�ra and Francis (1967), we selected 180 
nouns and adjectives with frequencies below 70. All words contained 
five, six, or seven letters. One third were neutral, one third negative, and 
one third positive in emotional valence. 1 
The 180 words were placed in six groups, each of which contained 
equal numbers of words from each valence and part of speech. Word 
frequency and length were closely balanced. Next, two of the six groups 
were assigned to each of three experimental lists; one of the two groups 
on each list was later used on the inclusion test and the other, on the 
exclusion test. The purpose of the three main lists was, however, to pro­
vide 60 items each for Phase I (relatedness ratings), Phase 2 (heard 
items), and the test (new items). During the test each subject encoun­
tered all l80 words but in different roles (rated, heard, or new items) and 
under different instructions (inclusion or exclusion). These two factors 
produced the six counterbalanced, word-presentation conditions. 
Lists for Phase 1 and Phase 2. The words on each of the three main 
lists were randomly ordered for presentation during Phase I or Phase 2, 
with the exceptions that no 2 words of the same valence or from the 
same original block appeared consecutively. For presentation during 
Phase 2, each list was tape recorded by a female experimenter at a rate 
of approximately 1.5 s per word. 
To construct the rating task in Phase I, each word was paired with an 
extralist word of the same length, part of speech, and frequency. Each 
paired word was emotionally neutral, semantically unrelated to the 
target word (according to the judgment of the authors and an experi­
menter), and followed it on the same line in the computer display. 
Test list. The practice section of the test list consisted of 3 words 
(one of each valence) from each of the six original groups . These words 
were assigned to one of two practice blocks-one inclusion and one 
exclusion-of 9 words each. Responses to these 18 items were not 
analyzed. 
The main part of the test list consisted of the remaining 27 words 
from each of the six original groups. They were redistributed across six 
test blocks of 27 words each. Each test block contained 9 Phase I words, 
9 Phase 2 words, and 9 new words. Three test blocks were assigned to 
inclusion and three, to exclusion instructions, with the order alternated 
across blocks. Therefore, under each instruction the subjects saw 27 
words they had rated, 27 they had heard, and 27 that were new. 
Within each block of 27, the words were grouped according to va­
lence. The order of presentation within valence was random but limited 
to no consecutive occurrences from the same experimental list. 
In the test phase the words occurred as single items for one half of the 
subjects and as the first members of pairs for the other half. In the paired 
condition the words were presented together with their partner from the 
Phase 1 rating task. For Phase 2 and new words, we used the partners 
that appeared when those words were Phase I words for other subjects. 
Procedure 
Phase I. First, the subjects were instructed to judge the degree of 
semantic relatedness within each of 60 word pairs. They were told that 
many of the words in the pairs would not seem to be very related but 
that, nevertheless, they should make their judgments carefully. Each 
pair of words was presented for 2 s on the same line (target first) and 
centered on the screen; words appeared in white against a black back­
ground. With their offset, a scale from 1 (unrelated) to 5 (very related) 
appeared at the bottom of the screen for 2 s. The subjects responded by 
pressing the number key that corresponded to their judgment. After a 
blank screen that lasted 500 ms, the next pair of words appeared. 
Phase 2. Next, the subjects were told to listen carefully to a list of 
recorded words in anticipation of a later memory test. They were told 
1 Emotional valence was originally included as a factor in the design, 
in an attempt to obtain evidence for mood-congruent recollection or familiarity.,No�evicJcm;e was found; instead, a serie&Df main effects revealed that neptiVe words were endorsed most frequently (positive 
next and neut{Jd least) when they served as new items or heard items or 
were used in the exclusion test. Estimates of familiarity were highest for 
negative words; estimates of recollection were lowest. These differences 
may be attributed to the fact that negative words were most emotional 
and to the probability that they were interrelated to a greater degree 
than were words in the other categories and therefore least 
discriminable. 
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that the list was long and that they would not be expected to remember 
all the words. They might, however, want to repeat the words to them­
selves or to do whatever normally facilitated their memory. The tape 
contained 60 words, read at a 1.5-s rate. 
Test. In the final phase the words on the test list were presented for 
6 s each in the middle of the screen, either alone or as the first word in a 
pair, depending on the testing condition to which the subject had been 
assigned. Under both inclusion and exclusion conditions, the subjects 
responded by pressing keys labeled old and new. The Nand V keys on 
the keyboard were used for this purpose; the subjects rested their index 
fingers on those keys. A blank screen of 500-ms duration separated dis­
plays; responses that were made after the offset of the item were counted 
as missing. 
Before each practice block and test block, the screen displayed the 
instruction for the upcoming set of items. These instructions read, "In­
clude items from Phase I by typing OLD" and "Exclude items from 
Phase I by typing NEW." For half of the subjects, the first practice block 
was an inclusion block, and for the other half it was an exclusion block; 
blocks then were alternated between instructions, although the order of 
words remained constant. These first two instructional screens were 
used as opportunities to remind the subjects about the requested judg­
ments. When ready to proceed, the subjects pressed a key to begin the 
block. 
At the beginning of the single-item test phase, the subjects read the 
following instructions: 
The next task is a recognition task. You will be asked to recognize 
words from the previous phases in one of two ways. First, when the 
instruction to INCLUDE is given, your task is to strike the OLD 
key if the item occurred previously in this experiment. You may 
remember that the item occurred as the first member of a pair on 
the computer screen, or you may remember the item from the au­
dio tape. Strike NEW only if you do not remember the item from 
either phase. In other words, when you are told to INCLUDE, 
strike OLD if the item was previously presented and NEW if it 
was not. Second, when the instruction to EXCLUDE is given, you 
should exclude items from Phase I (the ones you judged on the 
computer). If the item feels familiar but you remember that it oc­
curred in Phase I, strike NEW. Also strike NEW if it is a new item . 
Strike OLD only if the item seems familiar but you do not remem­
ber it occurring in Phase I on the computer. By the way, the second 
members of the pairs in Phase 1 will not appear as items in these 
tasks. Please note that you will always strike OLD to items from 
the audio tape. However, you should not try to remember the tape; 
that's too hard. Just trust that if an item seems familiar but you do 
not remember it from Phase I, it was probably on the tape. 
These instructions were modified for subjects in the paired test con­
dition. They were told: 
The next task is a recognition task. Pairs of words will appear on 
the screen, one pair at a time. You will be asked to determine if the 
first word in the pair occurred in the previous phases. If the first 
word was in Phase I, when you judged words on the computer, you 
can trust that the second word was also paired with it in Phase I.  
But if  the first word was not in Phase I,  the second word on the 
screen will be a new word. You will make decisions about the first 
words of the pairs in one of two ways, and you may find that the 
second words help you to make those decisions. First, when the 
instruction to INCLUDE is given, your task is to strike the OLD 
key if the item occurred previously in this experiment. You may 
remember that the item occurred as the first member of a pair on 
the computer screen, or you may remember the item from the au­
dio tape. Strike NEW only if you do not remember the item from 
either phase. In other words, when you are told to INCLUDE, 
strike OLD if the item was previously presented and NEW if it 
was not. Second, when the instruction to EXCLUDE is given, you 
should exclude items from Phase I (the ones you judged on the 
computer). If the item feels familiar but you remember that it oc-
Table 2 
Mean Estimates of Recollection and Familiarity 
(and Standard Deviations) 
Measure and group 
Recollection 
Nondysphoric 
Dysphoric 
Familiarity 
Nondysphoric 
Dysphoric 
Note. n = 18. 
Single item 
.31 (.19) 
. 20 (. 24) 
.45 (.14) 
.50(.13) 
Paired 
.54 (. 20) 
.40 (.24) 
.56 (.24) 
.55 (.24) 
curred in Phase I, strike NEW. Also strike NEW if it is a new item. 
Strike OLD only if the item seems familiar but you do not remem­
ber it occurring in Phase I on the computer. Please note that you 
will always strike OLD to items from the audio tape. However, you 
should not try to remember the tape; that's too hard. Just trust that 
if an item seems familiar but you do not remember it from Phase 
I, it was probably on the tape. 
Before the subjects began the practice trials, the experimenter asked 
them to paraphase the instructions; they discussed the instructions until 
the experimenter was satisfied that they understood. 
Results 
Estimates of Recollection and Familiarity 
First, the proportions of rated words judged old under inclu­
sion and exclusion instructions were converted to estimates of 
recollection and familiarity (Jacoby, 1991). These estimates 
were separately submitted to analyses of variance, with be­
tween-subjects factors for mood (nondysphoric vs. dysphoric) 
and the type of test (single-item vs. paired). (The significance 
level was set at .05 for these and subsequent analyses.) Means 
and standard deviations are displayed in Table 2. 
Estimates of recollection showed two reliable main effects. 
First, dysphoric subjects recollected fewer rated words (.30 vs. 
.43 for nondysphoric subjects), F(I, 68) = 5.73,MS. = .05. Sec­
ond, recollection was lower on the single-item test than on the 
paired test (.25 vs . .47), F( l ,  68) = 18.26. The interaction was 
not reliable (F < 1.00). 
Estimates of familiarity showed no reliable differences. The 
paired test, however, tended to produce greater familiarity (.56 
vs . . 48 in the single test), F( 1, 68) = 2.83, MS. = .04, p < . I 0. 
Other effects did not approach statistical significance (Fs < 
1.00). 
The results of these analyses provide evidence for a functional 
dissociation between recollection and familiarity that was es­
tablished by subjects' emotional state; dysphoric subjects 
showed impaired recollection but similar levels of familiarity­
based recognition. We gained further evidence of the indepen­
dence of the two components by evaluating correlations be­
tween the estimates within each group of subjects and finding 
nonreliable associations (p > .I 0): in the nondysphoric group, 
r (34) = .23, and in the dysphoric group, r (34) = -.12. 
The assumption of independent components also relies on 
evidence that the same criteria for responding old were used 
under both inclusion and exclusion instructions. We next re-
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Table 3 
Mean Percentages of Words Judged Old (and Standard Deviations) 
Single item 
Phase and group Inclusion 
Phase I 
Nondysphoric 62 (13) 
Dysphoric 61 (13) 
Phase 2 
Nondysphoric 65 (16) 
Dysphoric 67 (10) 
New distractors 
Nondysphoric 23 (14) 
Dysphoric 27 (13) 
Note. n = 18. 
port results from an analysis of the percentage of new items 
judged old, which was used to evaluate such evidence. 
Percentage Judged Old 
Table 31ists means and standard deviations of the percentages 
of Phase 2 and new words judged old. (It also presents the same 
information for Phase I words, so that the nature of the esti­
mates reported earlier can be better evaluated.) All percentages 
were based on a total of 27 items, with items for which no re­
sponse was obtained omitted (less than I %  of trials, on average). 
The percentages were separately submitted to analyses of vari­
ance for Phase 2 and new words. Each design included between­
subjects factors for mood and type of test and a within-subjects 
factor for instructions (inclusion vs. exclusion). Reliable main 
effects are not routinely reported when they are qualified by 
reliable interactions. 
New items. Again, the assumption about the independence 
of recollection and familiarity rests on evidence for the use of 
similar criteria in responding under inclusion and exclusion in­
structions. The most straightforward index of such criteria is 
supplied by responses to new items. The percentage of new 
words judged old did not vary reliably according to any of the 
three factors in the design. However, the results showed a trend 
in which subjects who took the paired test made fewer of these 
errors; the mean percentages of distractors judged old were 
19.3% on the paired test and 23.8% on the single-item test, F( I ,  
68) = 3.21, MS. = 230.20. p < . I  0. No such trends were found 
for instructions to include versus exclude or for any other effects 
in the design (all Fs < 1.00). In short, these results do not chal­
lenge the independence assumption, nor do they call into ques­
tion comparisons between the two mood groups. They do, how­
ever, suggest that all subjects may have used different criteria for 
judging test items as a function of the presence or absence of 
paired words. Therefore, comparisons of recollection and fa­
miliarity across the type of test must be viewed with caution. 
Phase 2 items. The percentage of heard words judged old 
differed reliably according to the type of test, F(l, 68) = 15.42, 
MS. = 313.79. Subjects in the single-item condition endorsed 
61.7% of heard words on average, compared with 50.1% for sub­
jects in the paired condition. This difference is not surprising, if 
one considers that the partners on the paired test were new to 
Paired 
Exclusion Inclusion Exclusion 
32 (13) 79 (16) 24 (13) 
41 (18) 74 (18) 34 (21) 
58 (17) 50 (16) 49 (15) 
58 (13) 50 (15) 52 (14) 
22 (12) 19 (II) 19(14) 
24 (14) 20 (12) 20 (13) 
subjects' experience; their presence on the test ought to have 
reduced the overall feeling of familiarity established by the dis­
play or may even have provided misleading routes for 
recollection. 
Although the level of endorsement of heard items appears to 
be at chance on the paired test, subjects clearly endorsed many 
more heard than new items, which suggests that some degree of 
discrimination occurred. 
Of greater importance is the reliable interaction of type of 
test with instructions, F(l , 68) = 5.26, MS.= 114.04. On the 
paired test, subjects endorsed the same percentage of heard 
words under each instruction ( 50.1% ), but the subjects who 
took the single-item test endorsed more words under instruc­
tions to include (65.7% vs. 57.7% under exclusion). This in­
teraction is addressed in the Discussion. Apart from the main 
effect of instructions, no other effects approached statistical sig­
nificance (Fs < 1.00). 
Performance Across Blocks 
A final set of analyses was performed on all measures of rec­
ognition by including a factor for blocks of items. There were 
three blocks of trials under both inclusion and exclusion in­
structions, with 9 items included in each. Instructions al­
ternated, but the order was counterbalanced within experimen­
tal and mood groups. We report only the reliable effects that 
involved the blocking factor, alone or in combination with other 
factors in each design. Although our predictions did not con­
cern such a factor, a reasonable question to ask is whether per­
formance by dysphoric subjects deteriorated across blocks to a 
greater degree than what was the case for nondysphoric 
subjects. 
Estimates of recollection and familiarity. Estimates of rec­
ollection2 decreased across the three blocks (.44, .35, and .30) 
regardless of mood and test conditions, F(2, 136) = 8.13, MS. 
= .05. Similarly, estimates of familiarity also decreased but only 
2 The basis for the drop in recollection was a drop in the percentage 
of targets judged old on the inclusion test (78%, 68%, and 61% across 
blocks); percentages were fairly constant during exclusion (34%, 34%, 
and 31%). 
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on the single-item test. The interaction3 of blocks with type of 
test was reliable, F(2, 130) = 4.42, MSe = .04. Mean estimates 
were .62, .47, and .38 on the single-item test and .55, .55, and 
. 50 on the paired test. The provision of prior context apparently 
maintained a rather constant sense of familiarity across blocks 
of trials. 
Percentage of items judged old. For all subjects new words 
were endorsed less frequently across blocks (24%, 22%, and 
19%), F(2, 136) = 3.74, MSe = 230.59. Finally, heard words 
were also endorsed less frequently across blocks (65%, 54%, and 
50%), F(2, 136) = 24.21, MSe = 356.90. In general, subjects 
became more conservative in their willingness to judge items as 
old as the number of test items increased. 
Discussion 
The primary finding in this study was a depressive impair­
ment in the recollective component of recognition memory, in 
the absence of differences in estimates of familiarity. This find­
ing is consistent with theories that predict impairments in con­
trolled processing (e.g., Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988; Hertel & Har­
din, 1990; Williams et al., 1988). Without the process dissocia­
tion procedure, however, the results from the (typical) inclusion 
condition in Phase I and from Phase 2 recognition showed com­
parable performance across mood. 
Depressed mood is yet another factor that establishes a disso­
ciation between two components of performance on tests of 
memory. One component is generally taken to reflect the auto­
matic effects of past experience. Jacoby (1991, p. 532) defined 
automatic influences of memory as those influences that re­
main constant, regardless of one's intention to remember. They 
affect recognition judgments even when one is trying to oppose 
or counteract the effects of the past, as is the case under exclu­
sion instructions. The conscious recollective component is de­
fined purely in terms of the difference in performance that re­
sults from intent to use versus not use past experience in per­
forming a current task. Such definitions avoid the problems 
that arise in trying to define controlled versus automatic pro­
cesses purely in terms of single testing conditions or response 
characteristics. 4 
Like Jacoby, we prefer to think of performance on memory 
tests in componential terms rather than to assume that different 
types of tests tap different unitary processes. In the latter regard, 
however, a number of investigators have shown that depressed 
moods are associated with differences on explicit memory tests 
but not on those of implicit memory (Denny & Hunt, 1992; 
Hertel & Hardin, 1990; Watkins, Mathews, Williamson, & 
Fuller, !992). Tests of explicit memory-like free and cued re­
call-are more likely in a relative sense to invite recollective 
or controlled procedures, whereas implicit-memory tests-like 
stem and fragment completion-are more likely to invite auto­
matic influences of prior experience with the materials. Each 
type of test, however, can be shown to vary in the extent to which 
that tendency holds (see Jacoby et al., 1993). 
Why were depressive deficits found in recollection but not in 
feelings of familiarity? In comparison with recollective compo­
nents of retrieval, a sense of familiarity is less likely to be 
affected by the degree of controlled processing during initial 
exposure in Phase I (see Jacoby et a!., 1993). If depression lim-
ited the degree of cognitive control during a study phase, then 
the effects would be seen in controlled procedures at test. This 
reasoning follows the general scheme known as transfer-appro­
priate processing (Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 1977). Alter­
natively, if depression were not associated with differences in 
Phase I processing, deficits in recollection would simply reflect 
the lack of controlled reference to the past at the time of the test 
and the possibly heavier reliance on feelings of familiarity. 
We did not examine possible differences in the use of con­
trolled procedures during Phase I. Instead, we manipulated the 
conditions under which recognition judgments were made in an 
attempt to improve cognitive control on the test. The 
representation of the partners from the initial rating task ex­
erted several effects. First, the paired test clearly increased rec­
ollection, but it also tended to elevate familiarity. These effects 
on the parameter estimates, however, must be understood cau­
tiously in the context of other effects of the type of test. The 
subjects tended to endorse fewer new items on the paired test 
than on the single-item test (although not reliably so); they were 
also more conservative in endorsing previously heard words. 
Both of these differences could well reflect the presence of the 
new partners with the heard and new items presented for recog­
nition. An unfamiliar context would of course not aid recollec­
tion of the heard words and further would make all such 
items-heard and new-seem less familiar, but old partners 
would elevate recollection, familiarity, or both. 
In the absence of old partners, list discrimination was more 
difficult. Recollection of Phase I targets can be seen as a prob­
lem in list discrimination that arose primarily on the exclusion 
test. Furthermore, this interpretation is relevant to the effect 
of instructions on single-item recognition of heard words from 
Phase 2. On the single-item test, lower rates of endorsing Phase 
2 words under exclusion may have reflected false recollection 
(Phase 2 words that were excluded on the basis of believing that 
they had occurred in Phase I ). This problem in list discrimina­
tion is central to performance on exclusion trials. That is, when 
3 The data from 3 subjects in the paired test were missing from this 
analysis. They recollected all words in at least one of the blocks, and so 
the estimate of familiarity was indeterminate. 
4 As discussed by Jacoby, Toth, and Yonelinas (1993), the process dis­
sociation procedure is both similar to and different from procedures 
that rely on signal detection theory. Like the process dissociation proce­
dure, signal detection theory is based on an independence assumption: 
Discriminability and bias are independent contributors to performance 
on recognition tests. Signal detection theory, however, is a single-process 
theory with respect to memory components, whereas the process disso­
ciation procedure includes two memory components. The familiarity 
component of the process dissociation procedure, moreover, can be un­
derstood to include the subcomponents of guessing influenced by prior 
exposure in the experiment and guessing influenced by uncontrolled 
bias. The component for familiarity can therefore be analyzed with sig­
nal detection methods to correct estimates on the basis of uncontrolled 
guessing; d' can measure the memory subcomponent of familiarity. An 
alternative method is to subtract base rates (proportion of new items 
endorsed) from familiarity estimates. For our results this method pro­
duced average estimates of familiarity {corrected for guessing) of .24 on 
the single-item test and .36 on the paired test but no differences associ­
ated with mood. (For a more thorough treatment of these issues , see 
Jacoby et a!., 1993.) 
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the same problem characterizes judgments about Phase 1 
words, such words are not excluded. In this sense one may say 
that something is familiar when one has encountered it before 
but does not know where. In keeping with this line of reasoning, 
list discrimination for Phase 2 items is arguably less of a prob­
lem on the paired test; the new partners provide information to 
rule out Phase I membership. 
Regardless of whether our interpretations of effects from the 
test and instruction manipulations are correct, we emphasize 
that none of these effects depended on mood. Any notion that 
dysphoric subjects were given particular advantage by aids for 
list discrimination or by increased familiarity was unsup­
ported. Therefore, the degree of controlled processing during 
Phase I may have been responsible for the depressive deficit in 
recollection. It is important to keep in mind, however, that dis­
tinguishing between encoding versus retrieval explanations is 
ultimately impossible (see Watkins, 1990). Cognitive control on 
the test may have been affected in ways unrelated to our manip­
ulation of context. 
In very general terms, depressive deficits in controlled proce­
dures are consistent with neuropsychological evidence in regard 
to attention and depression. Recent research has identified re­
gions of the frontal Jobes as loci of cognitive procedures in­
volved in voluntary attention, monitoring, and other metacog­
nitive activities (see the review by Mayes, 1988). Moscovitch 
and Winocur (1992), for example, provided evidence that di­
viding the attention of neurologically unimpaired subjects 
mimics effects of frontal-lobe damage. Another example is 
Posner's ( 1992) use of positron emission tomography tech­
niques to observe increased activation in certain frontal regions 
during prolonged maintenance of attention. Such scans have 
also revealed that hypometabolism in the frontal lobes corre­
lates with degree of depression, as do strokes that primarily 
affect the left frontal region (Resnick, 1992). Thus, there are 
possible neurophysiological bases for inferring that depressed 
moods are associated with reduced cognitive control. 
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